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Introduction 
 
In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board1 it was held that the explaining of risks by a 
medical practitioner when advising a patient was not governed by the Bolam2 test. Instead, 
the requirement was "to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any 
material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments". The test of materiality is "whether, in the circumstances of the particular 
case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the 
risk, or the doctor is or should be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach 
significance to it". The doctor should engage in a dialogue with the patient, in a manner 
which is comprehensible, with the aim of ensuring that the patient understands the 
seriousness of the medical condition, the expected risks and benefits of the proposed 
treatment and any reasonable alternatives.  
 
Subsequently, the courts have considered the applicability of this approach in the prospective 
liability of other professionals. In the context of solicitors’ liability, in Baird v Hastings3 the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal observed that the therapeutic duties owed by a doctor to a 
patient raised different questions from those arising between a solicitor and client, but that a 
solicitor must take reasonable care to ensure that the client understands the material legal 
risks involved in a transaction which the client has instructed the solicitor about. In common 
with the doctor/patient relationship, a solicitor should engage in dialogue with the client in a 
manner s/he can understand and materiality is the test - whether a reasonable client would be 
likely to attach significance to the risks arising which should be reasonably foreseeable to the 
competent solicitor.  
 
In O’Hare v Coutts,4 Montgomery was considered in relation to advice provided by an 
investment adviser employed by the defendant bank. O’Hare is the focus of this case note. 
 
The facts 
The O’Hares between 2007 and 2010 made five key investments, mainly on the advice of 
Coutts salesperson, Mr Shone. Mr Shone was a private banker at Coutts and was the main 
contact and relationship manager for the O’Hares from 2001 until he left Coutts in 2008. 
For the purposes of this case note the central element of the case was the contention that in 
contract and in negligence, these investments were unsuitable for the O’Hares’ appetite for 
risk. Mr Shone had recorded in contemporaneous of near contemporaneous notes and 
reports to his credit committee that Mr O'Hare was “keen” and “very keen” to enter into the 
investments. The O'Hares’ submission was that Mr Shone was a persuasive salesman who 
persuaded them to commit to higher risk products than they would otherwise have 
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favoured. Coutts defended the claim on the basis that the O’Hares were sophisticated 
investors, Mr O'Hare was an experienced businessman and Mrs O'Hare had a background 
is in business administration. The O’Hares overall wealth was estimated to be in a range of 
£25 million to £38 million which, Coutts argued, evidenced their business acumen and in 
this context the advice provided was appropriate to them. Coutts’ contention was that the 
claimants were confusing poor performance of the investments, recognised only with the 
benefit of hindsight, with unsuitability of the original investment advice. 
 
Kerr J’s analysis of the fact and the law 
 
Kerr J categorised Mr O’Hare as an astute businessman who knew something about 
investing, but his expertise was no match to that of Coutts, hence his need for investment 
advice from them. 5  In terms of the nature of the advice given, Mr Shone's correspondence 
to Mr and Mrs O'Hare indicated “a linguistic practice” describing acceptance of a 
recommendation by the O’Hares “as the formation of a view, as if the view were not 
informed by the recommendation.” 6 In that this and other evidence indicated that Mr 
Shone had utilised sales techniques, this in itself did not constitute a breach of duty by   
Coutts, even if the result was that the O'Hares had adopted more risk than might otherwise 
have been the case. The O'Hares' contract with Coutts provided, without charge, “advice 
about the investment services we offer and the kinds of investment that would in our view 
be most appropriate for you”. There was no compulsion to accept the advice, so Coutts 
could only profit if the O'Hares contracted separately for recommended products. Kerr J’s 
conclusion was that, as long as the products sold are suitable, selling and therefore the use 
of sales techniques are part of the “raison d'être” of a bank. Therefore, use by a private 
banker of persuasive sales techniques to induce a client to take risks which would not be 
taken but for that persuasion is not intrinsically wrong, as long as the client can afford to 
take the risks, demonstrates a willingness to take them and so long as the risks are not “so 
high as to be foolhardy”.7 In this latter respect, an investment adviser must not take 
advantage of a client’s “reckless gambling streak” nor advise the risk of all of his or her 
wealth, but when appropriate, “advice from a private banker may condition the client's risk 
appetite, rather than the other way round.” 8 Profit generation is not incompatible with such 
an approach. In the same way that a lawyer might be justified, even negligent in failing to 
give such advice, to warn a client that a settlement offer is unduly low and that the risk of 
going to trial is worth taking - even though the lawyer will generate additional fees from 
this approach – a provider of financial advice “might even be negligent” in failing to advice 
a client who is so risk averse that he might “lose out on a bonanza of high returns”. 9  
It was not in dispute that tort and contract impose equivalent obligations - to use reasonable 
skill and care when recommending investments. When determining whether or not these 
standards have been met, the Bolam test provides the court with a tool to consider whether 
the defendants acted “in accordance with a practice of competent respected professional 
opinion [within the banking sector]”. 10  
The court heard evidence from two expert witnesses, both with considerable experience in 
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advising on banking and financial markets and investments. There was little agreement 
between them, such that Kerr J concluded: 
“They did not reassure me that there is a clear consensus within the private banking and 
financial services industry about the boundaries that delimit the proper role of a financial 
adviser, and the extent to which use of persuasion to run risk, and thereby achieve sales, is 
acceptable practice.” 11 
In the absence consensus within the financial services industry about the approach to risk 
appetite and following the approach taken in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board in 
the medical context, Kerr J concluded that, with regard to giving investment advice, the 
extent to which communications is needed between financial adviser and client to ensure 
the client understands the advice and associated risks is not determined using the Bolam 
test. Kerr J also noted that the Financial Conduct Authority's Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (COBS) rules make no reference to a ‘responsible body’. Such industry or 
professional regulatory regime provisions constitute strong evidence of what the common 
law requires, given that “the skill and care to be expected of a financial adviser would 
ordinarily include compliance with the rules of the relevant regulator”.12 In this latter 
regard, the COBS rules included provision regarding requisite explanations which included 
similarities to the Montgomery requirements and, as such, were “very difficult to square 
with the application of a conventional Bolam approach.” 13 
Applying these considerations to the facts of the case, the claim failed. 
 
Commentary 
 
At its simplest, the decision in O’Hare v Coutts represents a rejection of the Bolam test in 
favour of the approach in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board  - when providing 
investment advice an bank should take reasonable care to ensure that the client is aware of 
any material risks involved in the recommended investment and be advised of any reasonable 
alternatives. However, the larger picture is perhaps more interesting. Montgomery may 
initially have been seen as reflecting a decision in a line of medical negligence case law 
which sits apart from the approaches taken in non-medical professional negligence cases and 
some other areas of negligence. [ref my book chapter]. This was the position following the 
House of Lords decision in the medical case, Chester v Afshar.14 For a short time after 
Chester was decided, concerns arose within the professional negligence community that it 
might herald a change in approach, in that instance to causation, more widely than its factual 
medical negligence context. These concerns were alleviated by White v Paul Davidson & 
Taylor,15 a solicitors’ liability case, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Chester 
principle should be restricted to clinical negligence cases involving the failure to warn of 
risk. Chester did not establish a new general rule, but rather the decision was limited to the 
policy exception deemed necessary to address the special importance of informed consent to 
medical treatment. In the following year, this position was reinforced by the decision in 
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Beary v Pall Mall Investments,16 a case involving claims for negligent financial advice, 
where Chester was also distinguished.[for further discussion, see my sols neg book, ch2] 
 
A little over a decade on from Chester, the position following Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board is looking different. We have a solicitors’ liability case in Baird v Hastings 
and now a financial advice case in O’Hare v Coutts in which the Montgomery approach has 
been adopted. However, the concerns following Chester arose from the prospect that an 
especially claimant friendly approach might cause problems for professions where advice 
giving was a primary focus. Any similar concerns following the decision in Montgomery 
will not have been reinforced by the decision in O’Hare v Coutts. Not only were the 
claimants unsuccessful, but they were unsuccessful even though Mr Shone, potentially a 
key witness, did not give live evidence.  Mr Shone had responded to calls to give evidence 
that he was “too preoccupied with other business responsibilities”.17 Admissible hearsay 
evidence, in the form of Mr Shone's contemporaneous notes were available. Mr O'Hare 
gave evidence in writing and at trial. It was argued on behalf of the O’Hares that Mr 
Shone's notes were misleading by omission - they omitted the elements which sought to 
influence Mr O'Hare's decision-making and exaggerated his appetite for risk. The O’Hares 
could have sought to compel Mr Shone’s attendance to enable cross examination, but 
instead chose to rely on the fact that Mr O'Hare's account of the relevant discussions 
would, in most instances, remain uncontradicted by any other witness.18 Kerr J found the 
latter approach reasonable, it was for Coutts to seek to rebut the O’Hares’ account of 
events.19 Kerr J described Mr O'Hare as an “honest and truthful witness”,20 subjected to 
“tough cross-examination” regarding the accuracy of Mr Shone’s record, whereas Mr 
Shone was not present to vouch for the accuracy of his documents and to seek to defend 
this position. 21  Notwithstanding this potential evidentiary weakness on the part of the 
defendant, the application of the Montgomery approach saw them successful. In 
Montgomery itself the focus is on ensuring full disclosure, whereas O’Hare presents more 
pragmatic underpinnings in terms of acknowledging that an element of sale persuasion is 
acceptable, even expected, and with respect given to the industry’s own rules. 
More broadly, the decision in O’Hare represents a further step away from Bolam, but a 
step only in bringing under the Montgomery umbrella situations where clients (as was the 
position with patients in Montgomery ) have discretion within their decision making.  
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